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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HEBER CRONQUIST, aka HEBER
0. CRONQUIST, and wife, IDELLA
N. CRONQUIST,

Plaintiffs and Appellants
vs.
UTAH STATE AGRICULTURAL

COLLEGE, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
L. TOM PERRY
GROVER GILES
S. D. HUFFAKER
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for the
County of Cache.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HEBER CRONQUIST, aka HEBER
0. CRONQUIST, and wife, IDELLA
N. CRONQUIST,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
vs.
UTAH STATE AGRICULTURAL
COLLEGE, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

In order that the Court n1ay better understand defendant's position in this matter, we desire to call attention to additional facts:
Olif Cronquist, being possessed of property worth
approximately $125,000.00, devises to his three children
property worth approximately $30,000.00 each. Exhibit
A. pages 3-6: 29-38. The Cronquist farm, situated just
north of the Utah State Agricultural College in Logan,
and the only property of the testator under a lease (inventoried at $27,000.00) was bequeathed to the Cache
Valley Banking Company in trust for twenty years. Ex.
A. pages 74, 108, 119. Olif Cronquist died on April 17,
1927.
One-third of the net rentals accruing between decedent's death and December 16, 1933, upon receipt
there-of by the trustee, were paid to Heber Cronquist.
Ex. A, 108, 119.
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Beginning December 16, 1933, and continuing until
November 25, 1939, Heber's share of the rentals were
paid, by assignment, to one Fred Lundberg. Ex. A. pages
120, 140, 148, ·155, 164. On March 10, 1940, on a second
assignment, Heber"s share was paid to the Cache Valley
Banking Company. Ex. A. page 172. Between May 20,
1940, and March 29, 1947, Heber's share of the rentals
was paid to The First Security Bank to apply on a note
secured by mortgage on Heber's share of the trust. Ex. A,
pages 172, 188, 196, 204, 212, 220.
The lease of the farm expiring in 1944, the College
sought to purchase other property but in November
9th of that year, Heber Cronquist and his wife entered
into an agreement with the Utah State Agricultural
College for the purchase and sale of his one-third interest
in the College farm for $10,000.00. Tr. 079, 039. Four
thousand and no /100 ( $4,000.00) was paid down and
the balance was to be paid at the termination of the
trust. Tr. 039. Between the time of the contract and
the termination of the trust one-third of the rentals
on the property was, under the contract, paid to Heber
Cronquist, or assignee.
He accepted said rentals, retained the $4,000.00 and
made no protest until he heard that his brother and
sister, some three years after the making of his agreement
\vith the College, during a period of inflation, had sold·
their interest to the College for a higher price. Tr. 066.
Then for the first time he protests and complains that he
had no interest in the property and because of having no
interest therein he could not contract to convey the same
and his agreement with the College was void.
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According to his brief, he bases this contention on two
points: ( 1 ) The trust created was a spendthrift trust, and
(2) That his interest in the said property being only a contingent remainder therein, he could not make a legal
contract to assign the same. Tr. 007.
ARGU:\fENT AND AUTHORITIES
I

Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School in his
recent work "Spendthrift Trusf' (1947) classes Utah as
one of the five states of the Union where there is no statute or case on the subject of spendthrift trust. Pages
38-270. He points out that the doctrine of spendthrift trust
is based on public policy and not on sound logic. Griswold: Spendthrift Trust page 634. See also 54 Am.
Jur. 128; Kelley vs. Kelley 79 Pac. 2d, 1059.
In the instant case the Court is called upon, for the
first time to determine a question of public policy. It.
should base its decision not only on the cases from other
jurisdictions but also consider the result of a policy, contended by appellant, that would leave title to real property
in such a condition as to make it impossible for an examiner of titles to determine when one had an assignable
interest in real estate.
Plaintiff has cited a number of cases in support of
his position that the will of Olif Cronquist created a
spendthrift trust. A grouping of these cases according to
the states where the decisions were made and the time
of the decision is helpful in determing the weight to be
given them as precedents .for our own count to follow.
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Such grouping also gives to the court the advantage
of the experience of other courts dealing with the problem of "Spendthrift Trusts." It should enable a court,
dealing with the problem for the first time, to adopt a rule
of construction that would not be subject to change.
PENNSYLVANIA
In an early Pennsylvania case, In Re. Stambaugh, 135
Pa. 585, 19 Alt. 1058 ( 1890) the court upheld a provision
in a will as a spendthrift trust where its provisions did not
expressly so state. In Trask vs. Shaffer ( Pa.) 14 Alt.
(2nd) 211, ( 1940) the will provided;
''To my son, Herman Shaffer, one-seventh of my
estate, which part I direct that my executor place in
a trust or other fund that will be completely administered. This fund to be established on basis that
this heir, Herman Shaffer, receive the annual income
earned by it; and in addition $200.00 annually from
the principal sum of the fund, or more if, in the
judgment of the officers of the trust, such increase in
the amount is needful and advisable."
At the death of Herman Shaffer, the remainder of
the trust, created for his benefit, was to be divided equally
arnong his heirs. Another son was given an identical
trust and the five children of the testator each got a oneseventh share to be paid to them direct. The First Nattiona! Bank was appointed trustee.
Plaintiff, holder of the judgment against Herman
Shaffer, garnisheed the bank. The lower court held that
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a spendthrift trust had been created and was not subject
to garnishment, basing its decision on the early Stambaugh case.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Lower Court saying,
"There is no semblance of uniformity among
other jurisdictions as to the rule of construction to
be applied in determining whether a testamentary
provision operates as a spendthrift trust. A rule of
excessive liberality in favor of a spendthrift tn1st was
applied In Re: Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 585.
In ~'lcCurdy vs. Bellefont Trust Company, 292 Pa.
407, the Supreme Court referred to the case of Stambauglis Eestate as an extreme case, repudiated its
doctrine, and arrested the trend in direction of liberality, retraced its steps and established the applicable rule firmly on conservative ground. The Stambaugh case is no longer reliable authority in Pennsyl. ,,
van1a.
Thus Pennsylvania, In adopting the rule of liberal
construction contended for by appellant, was forced in
the light of later experience, to reverse its early decision.
Reversal of decisions, on matters affecting title to real
estate,. should be avoided where ever possible.
ILLINOIS
Plaintiff's brief places great reliance on three early
decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois,
namely, ( 1) Bennett vs. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434; 75 NE
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339; 4 L.R.A.N .S. 470; and ( 2) Wallace vs. Foxwell, 250
Ill. 616; 95 NE 985; 50 L.R.A.N.S. 632, decided in 1911,
and (3) Wagner vs. Wagner, (Ill.) 91 NE 66.

In Bennett vs. Bennett, ( 1905) the case arose on the
petition of the benficiary asking the Court to require the
trustee to pay him the corpus of trust prior to the time
designated in the will for such corpus to be paid. The
Coutt refused the petition on the ground that it was a
spendthrift trust.

In Wallace vs. Foxwell, ( 1911) the beneficiary had
been adjudicated bankrupt, his interest in the trust property sold to the Second National Bank of St. Paul. The
trustee asked for a direction from the Court as to whether
the beneficary or the bank was entitled to the income from
the trust property. The Court decided that the trust was
in the nature of a spendthrift trust and nothing passed
to the bank from the bankruptcy sale.
In O'HARE vs. JOHNS.TON (Ill.) 113 N.E. 127,
( 1916) the testator placed in trust, bonds of the value
of $100,000.00. He directed that the trustee collect the
income and pay one-half to his son and the other half to
his daughter. At the end of a 30 year period, if both
children were living, the principal was to be divided
equally between them. In the event of the death of
either son or daughter, before the expiration of the trust
period, leaving issue, the income and principal, at the
end of the trust period was to be given to the issue.
The facts of the case are so similar to the facts in the
Cronquist will,. and appellant has placed such reliance on
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the decisions of the Supren1e court of Illinois, it may be
\Visdom to present a direct quotation from the decision
of the Court in the matter.
"But it is further argued that the entire fourth
clause of the will is a spendthrift trust provision for
the testator's children and grandchildren for a period
of 30 years, and that fact argues strongly for the
contingency of the gift. A spendthrift trust is
created with a view of providing a fund for the
maintenance of another and at the same time securing it against his own in1providence or incapacity.
Directions against alienation by the voluntary act of
the beneficiary or through legal process by creditors
are the usual incidents of such tn1sts. (citing authorities.)
"There is nothing in the wording of the will itself
as to this trust that indicates that it is of a spendthrift character. We find no restraint on alienation
and no discretion as to the payment of the income or
the principal. It is true there is evidence tendil)g to
show that the testator had expressed doubts as to the
son settling down in business as to whether he would
be able to take care of himself, and stating that the
daughter while in school, had been accustomed to
spend a good deal of .money which the father had
provided, that she was under age at the time the will
was drawn; and that both son and daughter had
depended on their father for support. But it is also
true that this fund referred to the .grandchildren as
well as the children, and the testator, naturally, could

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
not form an idea as to whether they would need the
protection of a spendthrift trust. It is the intention
of the testator that decides, under the authorities,
the character of the trust. If it is shown that his intention indicates a spendthrift trust, the court will not inquire whether the beneficiary is, if fact, a spendthrift. The will does not indicate that the testator
thought his children were spendthrifts. He gave to
each of them valuable real estate and a large amount
of other property. In addition to this he gave them
the income from the trust fund, which tends strong to
show that he had no suspicions or apprehensions as
to their ability to handle their own property."
Then came the case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Blair, 60 Federal 2nd, 340; decided in 1932:
"By his will decedent created a trust estate and
named as trustees hereof his nephew Chauncey J.
Blair and his son Edward T. Blair. By the terms of
the trust the wife of the testator was to receive onehalf of the net income of the trust estate during her
life, and taxpayer (son of said testator) was to receive theother half during his life, and, after the
death of testator's wife, taxpayer was to receive the
whole net income of the trust during his life.
Clause 20 of decedent's will reads as follows:
"I do hereby declare and direct that the income from
trust fund and estate which is herein ordered to be,
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fron1 tin1e to tin1e as the same shall be received, paid
to n1y said \Yife and to my said son and to his said
,vife and to their children and descendants of children in the cases aforesaid shall be paid to them
directly upon their separate order and receipt therefor, for their sole and separate use respectively, and
that the sa1ne shall not be nor be made nor held in any
n1anner nor by any proceedings whether in law or
equity while yet in the hands of said trustees liable
for or subject to the payment of any of the debts or
obligations of either of the persons entitled to the
same as above herein set forth."
The son Edward T. Blair assigned his interest in the
income from the trust property. The Boarl of Tax Appeals decided that the net income from the estate accruing
subsequently to the assignment was not taxable to Edward
T. Blair the assignor.
On appeal the ruling of the Tax Board was reversed,
the Court holding that Ed\vard T. Blair had no power to
make an assignment of the income of the trust. It based
its decision on the previous cases of Bennett vs. Bennett,
Wallace vs. Foxwell (ante) and others.
Mter the earlier cases, a Mr. Kales of the Illinois Bar
wrote a textbook on "Estates, Future Interests, and Restrainst on Alientaion in Illinois" in which he took issue
with the decisions of the Illinois Courts in Bennett vs.
Bennett and Wallace vs. Foxwell and offered some very
pertinent and constructive criticisms of the doctrine of
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spendthrift trust as interpreted by the Illinois Courf.
The Federal Court, however, in its decision declared it
was only concerned with the law of the State of Illinois
as the Illinois Courts had interpreted it, whether the
interpretation be right or wrong was beside the question.
It, therefore, adhered to the doctrine as expressed in
Bennett vs. Bennett and Wallace vs. Foxwell (ante), and
decided the will created a spendthrift trust.
Before paying the tax, however, the trustee, in the
case of Blair vs. Blair, 274 Ill. App. 23, asked for declaratory judgment construing the will. This case was decided
in 1934 and, therefore, represents the modern trend of the
law of spendthrift trusts.
While the Illinois Court does not expressly repudiate the earlier decisions of Bennett vs. Bennett and
Wallace vs. Foxwell, ·it declares that none of them involved an alienation of the trust fund by beneficiary.
The Court then adopts the theory of Mr. Kales by;
basing i~s opinion upon the following quotation from
"Kales on Future Interests" at Page 861:
"A mere trusteeship, even though for the protection of the beneficiaries, ought not as a matter of
l"Taken as a whole, the foregoing cases show as well marked as instances
as any, where our Supreme Court actually interprets the instruments by
·finding not what the testator expressed in words but what was the intention of his inducen1ent. The object and purpose of the inducement in
these cases apparently made not merely the standard of interpretation but
th.e very subject matter to be interpreted. This position has been taken
without any apparent appreciation by the Court of a complete departure
from the fundamental principles of interpreting writings which it involved." Kales Future Interests, Paragraph 748.
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taste, if for no other reason, be called a spendthrift
trust. Only where this is added to the trusteeship
express restraints on alienation is it justifiable to call
the creation a spendthrift trust. Whether restaints
on alienation, voluntary or involuntary, or both, are
added ought to be determined by the application of
the usual principles of consbuction to the language
used. If the restraints are not expressed, no amount
of extrinsic evidence or speculation and conjecture
as to the testators or settler's inducements ought to
be 'permitted to it into the will or settlement.'"
The Court then continues:
"If the testator had intended to restrict voluntary
alienation by his son, this could have been readily
accomplished by the use of a very few words. That
he did not use such words is strong evidence that
he did not so intend. Words even of doubtful meaning should not be construed as to inject an intention
into the will ma~ifestly contrary to that of the testator.''
The case then went up to the Supreme Court of the
United States because of the conflict between the State
Court in Blair vs. Blair, 274 Ill. App. 23, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Blair, 60 Federal 2nd, 343.
Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court
saying:
"Second. The question of the validity of the
assignments is a question of local law. The donor
was a resident of Illinois and his disposition of thP
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property in that State was subject to its law. By that
law the character of the trust, the nature and extent
of the interest of the beneficiary, and the power of
the beneficiary to assign that interest in whole or in
part, are to be determined. The decision of the state
court upon these questions is final. Spindle vs.
Shreve, Ill. U. S. 542, 547, 548, 28 L. ed. 512-514, 4 S.
Ct. 522; Uterhart vs. United States, 240 U. S. 598,
603, 60 L. ed. 819, 821, 36 S. Ct. 417; Poe vs. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 110, 75 L. ed. 239, 243, 51 S. Ct.
58; Freuler vs. Helvering, supra ( 219 U.S. p. 45, 78
L. ed. 641, 54 S. Ct. 308). It matters not that the
decision was by an intermediate appellate court.
Compare Graham v. White-Phillips Co. 296 U.S. 27,
80 L. ed 20, 56 S. Ct. 21, 102 A.L.R. 24. In this
instance, it is not necessary to go beyond the obvious
point that the decision was in a suit between the
trustees and the beneficiary and his assignees, and
the decree which was entered in pursuance of the
decision determined as between these parties the
validity of the particular assignments. Nor is there
any basis for a charge that the suit was collusive and
the decree inoperative. Freuler v. Helvering, supra.
The trustees were entitled to seek the instructions of
the court having supervision of the trust. That court
entertained the suit and the appellate court with the
first decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals before
it, reviewed the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the State and reached a deliberate conclusion. To
derogate from the authority of that conclusion and
. of ·the decree it commanded, so far as the question
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is one of state law, would be wholly unwarranted in
the exercise of federal jurisdiction."
'1n the face of this ruling of the state court it is
not open to the Governn1ent to argue that the trust
··was, tmder the Illinois law, a spendthrift trust."
The point of the argument is that, the trust being of
that character, the state law barred the voluntary
alienation by the beneficiary of his interest. The
state court held precisely the contrary. The ruling
also detremines the validity of the assignment of the
beneficiary of parts of his interest. That question
was necessarily presented and expressly decided."
Blair vs. Commission of Internal Revenue 300 U.S.S.,5
81 L. Ed. 465.
Would it not be wisdom, in interpreting the intention of the testator, Olif Cronquist, to adopt a rule
of construction, that withstands the test of time.
CALIFORNIA
In Seymour vs. McAvoy, 53 Pac. 946 ( 1898), an
action was brought to subject the interests in a certain
trust to the claim of creditors. While the will creating
the trust contained no express restriction against alienation, it did provide the following purposes:
" ( 2) To provide out of the income thereof for
the comfort, support, and maintenance of my beloved

wife.
" ( 1 ) To provide out of the income thereof for
port and education of my two daughters."
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The pertinent part of the decision is found in headnote No.2 which reads as follows:
"The author of a trust to pay to another the income of property may at common law provide that
the interest of the beneficiary shall not be subject to
the claims of his creditors, and such provision need
not be expressed, but may be implied from the terms
of the trust in the light of all the circumstances."
While the case marks the beginning of a liberal interpretation in favor of spendthrift trusts in the State of
California, it should not be authority to go beyond the
terms therein stated.
In Re Blakes Estate, 108 Pac. 287, has more to do
with the alienation of a contingent remainder and will be
discussed later.
The case of Fletcher vs. Los Angeles Trust & Savings
Bank, 187 Pac. 425, was an action to determine a trust.
The real question involved was whether a woman of the
age of 54 was presumed to be sterile. Such a presumption
exists in England but not in ~e United States.
With respect to the will of George C. Kimball
being interpreted by the Court, the Court declared:
"Where the trust is a spendthrift trust, or where
the settlor made known, expressly or plainly: his
intention that such power should not exist, or where
discretion as to the amount of the income to be devoted to the needs of the beneficiary is vested in the
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trustee, or where the effect of the trust is to direct accunlulations of the income until a fixed time, the
tn1st cannot be terminated by the court during the
pe1iod fixed by the trustor, even where all the beneficiaries are sui juris and consent thereto. There is
nothing, however, in the tn1st created by the will of
George C. Kimball which brings it within any of the
foregoing \veil-recognized limitations."
In Re DeLano>s Estate, cited by appellant the testator
twice used the word "Spendthrift Trust" in his will. The
court in interpreting the will said:
''There was no provision against alienation by
the benficiary of their interest in the trust property
nor did the will specifically declare that the trust was
made for their support, maintenance and welfare but
the purpose of the testator is no less clear because of
these admissions. It was disclosed by the use of the
terms 'Spendthrift Trust/ which has a well understodd legal meaning.>'
The above named California cases cited by plaintiff should be supplemented by a very careful consideration of the case of Kelley vs. Kelley, 79 Pac. 2d 1059
( 1938). In this case the beneficiary had made an assignment of his interest in a trust estate which had already
been held by the Courts to be a spendthrift trust. The
plaintiff brought suit on the assignment and the defendant
set up the invalidity of the assignment on the grounds
that it was a spendthrift trust. The Lower Court held
for the defendant but the Supreme Court reversed the
decision declaring:
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-"We find no requirement of public policy which
preclude their application here or compel the protection of the proceeds of a spendthrift trust after
they have reached the hands of the beneficiary from
the incidents of an otherwise valid engagement entered into during the life of the trust."
While California, has never extended its rule of
construction to the liberal extent contended for by appellant, in the Kelley case it reveals an intent to limit even
its conservative view by permitting an action for damage~
for breach of contract (on the part of beneficiary under
an express spendthrift trust) to alienate his interest.
Thus the Courts of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and California, who in the early days of 1ugged indvidualism
departed from the English rule and sustained the validity of spendthrift trust, and in such departure adopted
the extreme view that the testator did not need to create
the spendthrift trust by express words have in recent years
repudiated their early decisions by holding that the intention to create the spendthrift .tn1st ought clearly to
appear in the instrument creating the trust.
The case of Jones vs. Harrison, 7 Federal 2nd, 461,
on which plaintiff places such great re~iance can be distinguished from the case at bar. In Jones vs. Harrison,
a petition in bankruptcy was filed by the trustee to sequester for the benefit of creditors the interest of the
bankrupt in the trust estate created by will. The petition
was resisted by the trustees under the will. The Court
granted the petition holding that the will created a
spendthrift trust. It based its decision on three points:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
( 1) "Courts have held that the fact of placing
property in the hands of a trustee evidences intent
on the part of the testator to put it beyond the power
of the beneficiary to alienate.
( 2) Turning, now, to the will which is here
rmder consideration, there is but a single item in its
language which expresses an intent of the testator to
impose restrictions upon the beneficiary's interest.
That is fotmd in the use of the word "direct," as to
the income accruing between the beneficiary's
twenty-fifth and thirty-fifth year. The will requires
this income to be paid by the trustees to the beneficiary "direct." This fairly imports that such payments were not to be made to alienees or to creditors.
This language, however, is not used with respect to
the payment of any other income, or to the payments
out of the capital of the trust.
( 3) Looking now to the circumstances and to
all the provisions of the will, the Court finds as a
further ground in support of the restriction that a
large part of the estate was placed absolutely under
the son"s contro1"
.
Two elements of the Cronquist will are similar to the
will interpreted by the Court in Jones vs. Harrison: ( 1 )
The property was placed in the hands of the trustee, and
( 2) The testator bequeathed part of the property to the
son absolutely and another part to a trustee.
The Cronquist will, however, does not contain the
third element which to the Federal Court was the es-
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sential element, namely, that the money was to be paid
direct to the beneficiary.
"
When we consider. that the Federal Court in Jones
vs. Harrison based its decision on the cases from Illinois
and when we further consider that the Illinois Court,
distinguishes between cases brought to set aside a contract by the beneficiary and an action to make the beneficiary's interest subject to his debts, and :when we further
consider that in Jones vs. Harrison the will provided that
the money was to be paid direct to the beneficiary the
case of Jones vs. Harrison is but little aid to a Court
which is called upon to interpret the Cronquist will.
KANSAS
Plaintiffs cite two decisions from the State of Kansas
in support of his position that the will of Olif Cronquist
created a spendthrift trust. The first is Everitt vs. Haskins, 171 Pac 632. In this case the will provided:
"The share of my son William Henry, as provided herein, shall not be given into his control,. but
shall be put into the hands of my executor, Wm. M.
Peck, as trustee for my said son. Said trustee shall
invest and manage the same, as to him seems best,
and pay to my said son the sum of three hundred
dollars ( $300.00) per annum, in semi-annual installments of $150.00 each, but such amount may be in-

creased to whatever may be considered necessary,
by the trustee, by any change in condition of said
William Henry, to an amount sufficient for his comfort. Such amount to be paid by the executor, or
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trustee, out of any money thus coming to him,
whether 'income, increase, or the corpus of the estate
so given; it being my intention that he shall have,
as above provided, the said sum of three hundred
dollars, or more if necessary, per year, so long as there
shall remain any property herein given him from
which to pay it. Should there be any of the estate
herein given to my son William Henry remaining at
his death, it shall be paid over and conveyed by the
trustee to the heirs of said William Henry. It is my
tvill and I hereby direct, that in no event shall any of
my estate ever be given to the husbands, eithef'.
present or future, of my daughters, but shall be kept
free from· such hubands, during the life of my said
daughters, and, if any remains of their respective
shares at their death, it shall go to their heirs, other
than their husbands,, (italics· supplied)
That portion of the will in italics was taken by the
Court to show an intention on the part of the testator to
limit the power of creditors to levy on the beneficiary's
interest. But no such provision is found in the Cronquist
will. There is no intimation that the bequest is for the
support of the plaintiff. Nor is there a provision that
the part not needed for the support of Heber goes to another at the end of the trust period.
The trend of the Kansas Court is in the same direction
as the the Courts of Pennsylvania, I_llinois, and California.
In Re Watts Kan. 162 P. (2nd) 82 (1945), the will of
Nlary D. Watts provided for the creation of a trust and
directed that the trustees pay Corwin Grant Watts at such
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thnes as to them may seem necessary such sums of money
as shall in their judgment be necessary for the proper
1naintenance, support, and education of the said Corwin
Grant Watts and at the age of 21 years, corpus of the property was to be turned over to Corwin Grant Watts if
in the judgment of the tJustees he had attained sufficient business judgment to handle the property. The
Court pointed out that as the will created a discretionary
trust as distinguished from a spendthrift trust and that
the trust property was not liable to satisfy a judgment
against Corwin Grant Watts for alimony.
'The decisions of the Kansas courts, will be further
discusse~ under Part III of this brief where they properly
belong, but this observation is now pertinent. Had the
Kansas Court in the early case of Everitt vs. Haskins fully
appreciated the distinction between a 'spendthrift' and a
'discretionary' trust the case of Everitt vs. Haskins could
never be referred to in a discussion of the subject of
spend thrift trusts.
Summing up the authorities cited by plaintiff in his
brief, we are willing to admit that the American Courts
generally sustain the validity of spendthrift trusts when
the trust instrument clearly expresses such an intention.
We can further concede that there is some authority to
the effect that the restraint against alienation by the
beneficiary need not be stated in express terms. WE
VIGOROUSLY
CONTEND,
HOWEVER, THAT
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE CRONQUIST WILL
FROM WHICH IT MAY BE EVEN INFERRED THAT
THE TESTATOR INTENDED TO LIMIT THE
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PO\VER OF HIS BENFICIARIES TO AGREE TO
CONVEY THEIR INTEREST IN THE TRUST ESTATE.
~~Iany

cases could be cited to support our position
but for sake of brevity we quote from text writers who
have reviewed all the cases and conclude as follows:
"But there is a. noticeably tendency in the decisions of today, as compared with. those of a generation ago, to require that the intention to create a
spendthrift trust appear clearly in the instrument."'
Griswold, "Spendthrift Trusts," page 300.
c:'Courts have occasionally held that trusts were
spendthrift trusts when it was exceedingly difficult
if not impossible to find an indication in the terms
of the trust that the settler intended any such limitation on the interest of the beneficiary. These cases
deserve no following. The intention to establish the
spendthrift trust ought clearly to appear in the instrument creating the trust, for, as more than one
court has observed, any other rule, c:would in effect
saying that all life estates of like character, given
in trust, are incapable of being alienated.' There
should be specific language declaring the trust a
spendthrift trust or language from which such interest might reasonably be inferred. A mere trusteeship is not enough to rnake a spendthrift trust. Griswold, "Spendthrift Trusts," pages 303-304.
c:'An intention to create a spendthrift trust which
the beneficiary cannot assign nor any of his creditors
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disturb is manifested by a provision to the effect that
all moneys paid to apy beneficiary shall be paid into
his hands and not into the hands of any other person,
without the right of anticipation, a provision for payment to the beneficiary for his support on his receipt, and that the beneficiary should have no power
to charge, encumber, or anticipate the income; a provision for payment into the hands of the beneficiary
and not upon any written or verbal order or upon
any assignment or transfer; or by a provision that
the beneficiary shall not be entitled at any time to
alieniate, anticipate, or encumber his share of the income or principal, and that the same shall not be
liable for his debts. __ But no intention to impose a
restraint on the alienation of income is to be found, it
has been ruled, merely from a direction that thp
trustee should apply it to the support and maintenance of the beneficiary.:~:~ 54 Am. Jur. 125.
"There is no presumption that every trust to
pay over income is a spendthrift trust." Bogert on
Trusts, Voll, Par. 225.
"To create a valid spendthrift trust the language of
the founder must be clear and unequivocal to that effect."
25 R. C. L. page 357.
"Every alleged spendthrift trust must be judged
on its own facts. No formula is needed to create
such a trust, and no prescription can be given for
establishing one, except the use of clear and simple
language prohibiting alienation of the cestui's interest." Bogert Trusts, Vol. 1, page 739.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
"The general rule that the extent or interest
of the cestui que trust will be controlled by the provisions of the trust instrument applies to spendthrift
trusts but there is a presumption against the creation
of a spendthrift trust unless either words to that
effect are set forth or the clear and undoubted intention to the same end is n1anifested by the terms
of the instrument. Where the property is conveyed
to the trustee in fee simple in trust for the beneficiary
until he arrives at a certain age, at which time it is
-conveyed to him absolutely, no spendthrift trust is
created.'' 65 C. J. 542.
We supplement these statements by: Trash vs.
Shaffer (ante); Blair vs. Blair (ante); Kelley vs. Kelley
(ante), and the following other cases:
NEWELL v. TUBBS, (Colo.) 84 Pac. 2d, 820,
( 1939 ).
Action by Newell against Tubbs to annul an assignment by plaintiff to defendants of plaintiff's interest under
a trust. The will provided that the income from the trust
estate was to be used for the education of the greatgrandchildren of the testator, the principal ultimately to
be divided among the beneficiaries.
Teseator died in 1925, Newell, a great-grandson, on
February 7, 1934, for a valuable consideration, executed
a written assignment of his interest in the trust estate to
Tubbs.
Court found in favor of the defendant saying, "A
spendthrift trust is 'a trust created to provide a fund for
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the maintenance of the beneficiary, and at the same time
to secure it against his improvidence or incapacity.;, 65 C.
J. 230. Clear and unequivocal language is necessary to
create such a trust or, in the absence of such language,
the intention to create must clearly appear from the language of the entire instrument. 65 C. J. 265. In the document under consideration in the instant case we find
none of these requisites."
POOL vs. CROSS COUNTRY BANK, 199 Ark 144,
133 s.w. 19, ( 1939).
Cross Country Bank brought suit to foreclose trust
deed executed by John D. and Anne B. King, given to
secure note of grantors. Property came to King by will
of his mother :which provided:
All property to trustees to hold for son, J. D. King.
Pay son $100.00 per n1onth or more if sick, income free
from debts. If son dies and leaves issue, then income to
son. All parties interested had quitclaimed to son.
Held no restraint on alienation. "A mere trusteeship, even though it is for the protection of the benficiaries, ought not, as a matter of taste, if for no other reason,
be called a spendthrift trust. Only where there is added
to the trusteeship express restraints on alienation, it is
justifiable to call the creation a spendthrift trust."
Foreclosure was permitted.
MII.JLER vs. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY,
(Ark.) 180 S. W. 581, ( 1944).
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"Although one may limit the grant, presun1ption of
law in that he has not done so unless there are express
words, or a clear and undoubted intention is expressed
in the will.n
BAKER vs. KEISER, 75 Md., 332, 23 Atl. 735.
In tn1st to daughter for life, then to children. Action
bv creditors for income.
J

In the opinion the court used this language:
"Without importing words into that will which
are not there, and imputing an intention to the testator of which he has given no intimation by any
verbal expression, we cannot say that the income
was not and is not assignable by the life tenant; and
if it is, there was error in holding it to be beyond the
reach of creditors. Any other construction of this
will and ruling in this case would be in effect saying
that all life estates of like character, given in trust,
are incapable of being alienated."
.PICKENS vs. DORRIS, 20 Mo. App. 1,
Here property given trustee to pay income to children.
The Court refused to impose a restriction upon
the tn1st saying:
"There is nothing in the will itself which would
indicate that trust thus created was in the nature of
a spendthrift trust and to seek in the surounding
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circumstances a reason for declaring it to be such,
the authorities do not warrant and sound policy forbids.~

NUN vs. FITCHE-GOETTENGER, 245 S. W. 421.
"According to great weight of authority, however, where instrument creating the trust contains
no expressive words of restraint and nothing on its
face declaring that the purpose of the trust is to provide a support of the beneficiary or furnish him with
the comforts of life, and where it is declared that
and where it requires that the· income from the trust
shall be paid directly to the beneficiary without any
discretion in the trustee as to time or amount of
payment or the purpose for which they shall be applied, such revenue may be anticipated or assigned
by the beneficiary."
We may conclude that the modern decisions are
unanimous in holding that a mere trusteeship is insufficient to show an intention to create a spendthrift trust.

II.
In as much as the third subdivision of appellant's
brief is more closely related to the first subdivision than
the second, I shall discuss part III before part II .
. Part III of Appellant's brief approaches the very
core of the question in this case, viz;
What provisions in the Cronquist will evidences an
intent on the part of the testator to prevent his children
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from selling or contracting to sell, t4eir interests in the
trust property? But it is only an approach-plaintiff does
not follow through.
· Throughout plaintiff's brief only two provisions of
the \viii are cited to show that the testator intended to
prevent his children from alienating the trust property.
First: The provision that the property was placed
in trust. (Appellant's Brief pages 26 and 27. ) This contention has already been disposed of.
Second. The provision that part of the property was
given to the children direct and part placed in trust.
(Brief, page 10.)
It is true that two other arguments are made. One
that the testator created. an estate of such nature that
made it unassignable_. That argument will be ·answered
in Part III of this brief. The other is that the very fact
that the children tried to sell their trust estate after the
death of the testator. This final argument is not based
on the will itself but springs from facts outside of the will.
This last contention has such little weight that it may
be disposed of at this time. In fact in his brief, appellant,
provides his own refutation. (Brief pages 10 and 11.)
If the "mere circumstance that the plaintiff survived the
trust period cannot be permitted to alter the testator's
intent'" it would be just as true that the mere circumstance
that the plaintiff tried to borrow money six years after
the death of the testator should not be permitted to alter
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the intent of he testator at the time he made his will.
One cannot change a testamentary intent of date of April
11, 1927 by showing an act of a third person on Dec. 16,
1933.
The second provision found in the will itself, from
which appellant argues for a spendthrift trust is stated
as follows:
"The very fact that testator gave each of his three
children a substantial portion of his estate and put the
balance, also a substantial portion, in trust," shows an
intent on his part to limit their powers to sell the same.
But we must remember that the portion that was placed
in trust was the only property of the testator under lease.
The Cronquist farm (or trust property) had been leased
to the Utah State Agricultural College for a long time and
the lease had ·many years to run. The rental on this
lease was to be split three ways. Someone had to be
appointed to collect the rent and distribute the income.
the most likely person to make such distribution was the
Cache Valley Banking Company, the person named as
executor.
We also call attention to the fact that in O'Hara vs.
Johnson, (Ill.) 113 NE 127, the Court reasons:
"Inasmuch as the testator gave each of then1
valuable real estate· and a large amount of other property. In addition to this he gave them the income
from the trust fund which tends strongly to show
that he had no suspicion or apprehension as to their
ability to hold their own property."
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See Black vs. Jones 264 Ill. 548, 106 N.E. 462.
The reasoning of plaintiff on this point deserves the
criticism that Mr. Kales gave the Illinois Courts. See
Note 1, page 10.
~o

say that because the testator gave part of his
property in trust and part direct shows that he did not
trust his children and then to reason that the lack of confidence in the financial ability of his children was an
inducement to give part in trust and part direct and from
that conclude that the testator intended to create a spendthrift trust, may trick one to a conclusion based on confusion. But it should not stand in the way of clear
thinking and be used to show that testator did not want
his children to sell their interest. ·If he wanted to restrict them, why did he not say so? Words to show such
an intention were at his command.
Ill

Part two of plaintiff's brief discloses another question,
namely, Apart from any question as to the intention
of the testator to prohibit alienation by a beneficiary of
his interest, did the testator create an estate of such a
nature that it could not be alienated? Plaintiff's answer
to this question is as follows:
"One of the determining factors in a case of this
kind is, whether the testator has devised the legal
title in the trust property to the trustee to hold during the trust period. If that fact definitely appears
from the language of the trust instrument then the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·30
Courts hold that the beneficiary has no vested interest in the trust res, which he can alienate or dispose of during the trust period. In Re: Blakes
Estate, (Cal.) 108 Pac. 287; Meek vs. Briggs, 98
Iowa 610; Richardson vs. Warfield, 148 N. E. 141;
Everett vs. Haskins, ( Kan.) 171 Pac. 632; Watts· vs.
McKay, (2nd) (Kan. 162 P. 82); Jones vs. Harrison
7 F. (2d) 467.
This statement does violence to the fundamental law
of trusts and it is not even supported by the authorities
quoted.
"In absence of provisions in the trust instruments
or statutes to the contrary, the cestui trust may
alienate his interests as freely as he might a legal
estate or interest. The consent of trustee is not
necessary."'' Bogert Trusts, Vol. 1 Paragraph 188.
"Both in England and in the United States today it is clear that the beneficiary of a trust, unless
he is under legal incapacity, can transfer his interest
under the trust, unless his interest is made unalienable by the terms of the trust or by statute. He can
transfer his interest to a third person, to a co-beneficiary, or to the trustee. As was said by the court
in New Jersey; ''Trust estates are subject to the
same incidents, properties, and consequences as,
under like circumstances, belong to similar estates
in law. They are alienable, devisable, and descendable, in the same manner.'' Scott on Trusts, Vol. 1,
Par. 132.
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"On the whole, it seen1s probable that, in except
a very small number of jurisdictions, contingent remainders and executory interests of all kinds, are
freely alienable. McAdams vs. Bailey, 82 N.E. 1057;
169 Ind. 518, 13 L.R.A.A.N.S. 1003; Beacom vs Amos,
77 S.E. 407; 161 N.C. 717; Lee vs. Oates, 171 N.C. 717
Ann. Cas. 1917A 514; Habgood vs. Habgood, 86 S.
E. 189; 171 N. C. 485; Love vs. Lindstedt, 147 P. 935
76 Ore. 66, Ann. Cas., 1917A 898; Jerman vs. Nelson,
135 Ore. 126; 293 Pac. 592; Re Robbins Estate, 49
A. 233, 199 Pa. 500." Simes 4:'Future Interests," ( 1936)
Vol. 3, page 159. Par. 714.
"It thus appears that, \vhether there be any applicable statute or not, any variety of future interests
in land may be conveyed by release, by estoppal, or
by contract, specifically enforeable in equity, if there
is any person capable of executing a deed who may
be said to have a future interest.'" Simes "Future
Interests" Vol. 3_ Par. 710, page 150.
In Blair vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
300 U. S. 5, 81 L. Ed. 465, the will provided for the creation of the trust estate and for the payment by the
tn1stees of the income from the estate to the son of his
testator.
The Court in commenting on the right of the beneficiary to assign his interest said:
"The will creating the trust entitled the petitioner during his life to the net income of the pro~
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perty held in trust. He thus became the owner of
an equitable interest in the corpus of the property.
Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U. S. 589, 598, 599, 59 L. ed.
374, 378, 35 S. Ct. 154; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S.
161, 167, 168, 69 L. ed. 897, 898, 899; 45 S. Ct. 475;
Senior v. Braden 295 U.S. 422, 432, 433, 79 L.ed. 1520,
1525, 1526, 55 S. Ct. 800, 100 A.L.R. 794; Merchants'
Loan & T. Co. vs. Patterson, 308 Ill. 519, 530, 139
N .E. 912. By virtue of that interest he was entitled
to enforce the trust, to have a breach of trust enjoined and to obtain redress in case of breach. The
interest was present property alienable like· any other,
in the absence of a valid restraint upon alienation.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Field C.C.A.
(2d) 42 F. (2d) 820, 822; Shanley v. Bowers C.C.A.
(2d) 81 F. (2d) 13, 15. The beneficiary may thus
transfer a part of his interest as well as the whole.
See Am. Law Inst. Restatement, Trusts, vol. 1 Par.
130, 132, et. to seq. The assignment of the beneficial
interest is not the assignment of a chose in action but
of the "right, title and estate in and to property."
While our own court has not passed directly on the
question in Latimer vs. Holliday, 103 Utah 152; 134 Pac.
( 2d) 183, it ruled:
"Where the assignment of an expectancy is
fair, made, supported by fair consideration, equity
will enforce it if not contrary to public policy."
Even the cases cited by plaintiff do not justify the
conclusion that the mere vesting of title in the trustee
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prevents the beneficiary from disposing of the same during the trust period.
In Re: Blakes Estate (ante), the testator gave property to trustees to hold for his two daughters and a
granddaughter. When each of the beneficiaries attained
the age of 30 years, they were to receive from the trustees
one-third of the property. The granddaughter died at
the age of 27 and the Court was called upon to determine
whether her one-third share would pass to her children.
The Court gave the property to the children of said decedent holding that even though the granddaughter died
before she attained the age of 30 years, her children would
take her share as purchasers under the will.
The trust created in the cases of Meeks vs. Briggs,
Everitt vs. Haskins, and Watts vs. McKay are all discretionary trust and are disposed of in Re Watts vs. McKay
as follows:
"To the same effect, it is said in Vol. 1, Scott on
Trusts, page 774; "Where by the terms of the trust
a beneficiary is entitled only to so much of the income or p1incipal as the trustee in his uncontrolled
discretion shall see fit to give him, he cannot compel
the trustee to pay to him or to apply for his use any
part of the tn1s_t property. In such a case, an assignee
of the interest of the beneficiary cannot compel the
trustee to pay any part of the trust property, nor can
creditors of the beneficiary reach any part of the
trust property. This is true even in jurisdictions
where spendthrift trust are not permitted. If the
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benefiicary himself cannot compel the trustee to pay
over any part of the trust fund, his assignee and his
creditors are in no beter position. It is the character
of the benficiary;ls interest, rather than the settlor:~s
intention to impose a restraint on its alienation, which
prevents its being reached." (italics supplied). Also
see 26 R.C.L. 1268; 65 C. J. 557. Certainly the instant trust is purely discretionary as to the principal,
since-in the absence of abuse of discretion-the trustee may withhold it altogether from the beneficiary
if in his judgment the beneficiary is not capable of
handling it. The trustee's testimony as to lack of
capacity was not controverted and no showing made
that the trustee had abused his discretion."
There is nothing in the will of Olif Cronquist that
imposes any discretion on the part of trustee and the trust
therein created could not be classed as a discretionary
trust.
In Richardson vs. Warfield, (ante) the will porvided
that the real and personal property given to the tru.stee
"shall not be subject to any assignment, sale, or draft,"
and the Court simply held "the clause in the will providing that the property given to the trustees should not be
subject to any assignment, sale, or order, made it impossible for George A. Willis to pass any title by the assignment which he undertook to make. Thus the estate of
the benficiary was an equitable one and inalienable under
the terms of the will." Inalienable because of the express
terms of the will and not, as contended for by appellant,
inalienable because of the very nature of the trust.
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The final point contended for by the appellant and
pleaded in his complaint (Tran. 007) is that the
estate of the plaintiff being a contingent remainder only
could not be alienated. This point is not argued in plaintiff's brief. Either the point has been abandoned or purposely omitted to mis-lead respondent.
Neither can it be said that the provision in the will
for the estate to go to the grandchildren on the death of a
child created in the child a contingent remainder that
could not be alienated. The expression "or to their heirs
at law per stirpes and not per capita" is one favored by
the testator. He uses it not less than eleven times. (See
paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13 of the will.)
Paragraph 7 of the will provides; "To my sons Heber
and Elam, or to their heirs per stirpes and not per capita
I give, devise and bequeath my farm machinery. Because
of this provision could it be said that Heber had only a
contingent remainder in the farm machinery and he could
not sell the same?
Likewise in paragraph 5, of the same will the testator
devises to Elam and Margaret, "or !O their heirs per stirp·es
and not per capita,"' certain real estate. Does appellant
contenq that the interest of Margaret and Elam in said
real estate could not be assigned?
Why then should these same words show that the
testator had a different intent simply because they are
found in paragraph 3?
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Instead of arguing that such expression created an
estate that could not be sold why not seek a more consistent explanation.
In Gibbens v. Gibbens 140 Mass. 102, 3 N.E. 1 the
court declares: "An argument in favor of contingency is
drawn from the use of the words the issue of the deceased
child standing in the place of the parent. It is argued that
such issue, if there were any, would take at all events; that
the parent could not have disposed of his or her share, to
their exclusion .and that therefore the interest of the parent was not an absolute vested one. It is quite natural
and probable to infer that the words above quoted were
used for the purpose of showing clearly that the testator
did not intend the devise to lapse in case of the death
of one of his children leaving issue. Words to the effect
that the issue of deceased children shall take by right of
representation are not uncommon in wills, \Vhen strictly
speaking, they are entirely unnecessary; and the use of
so fan1iliar and common expression does not carry with
it is strong inference that the testator thereby designed
to express so1ne pecu~iar intention with reference to the
vesting or contingency of the interest devised."
CONCLUSION

'iV e therefore submit; ( 1. that because no spendthrift
was created and 2. the interest of plaintiffs in the trust property could be alienated) that the District Court did not
err when it ruled that the Plaintiff and Appellant should
be bound by his contract to convey to the Defendant his
"Lu1divided one-third interest in the property. That the
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Defendant having paid $4,000.00 on the contract and by
stipulation having deposited the balance of $6,000.00 with
the First Security Bank of Logan, as per stipulation of the
parties, (Tr. 019-22) is now entitled to a deed to the
property.
Respectively submitted
L. TOM PERRY
GROVER GILES
S. D. HUFFAKER
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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